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Over the past five years, several major international 
development policy statements and declarations 
have adopted ‘political settlement’ as a framing 
concept to guide statebuilding practice in fragile 
and conflict-affected states, and encouraged efforts 
towards achieving an inclusive, or inclusive enough, 
political settlement in order to underpin stability. 
Despite the policy enthusiasm, the concept itself 
remains elusive.1 This discussion paper explores 
how the concept ‘political settlement’ arose and 
where it came from, identifies its essential elements 
and the level of consensus around them and 
tests out some of its normative content. Finally it 
considers where the concept might go from here.
The Recent Appearance of ‘Political 
Settlement’ in International Development 
Policy
The concept made its debut in development 
policy around 20072 as policymakers wrestled 
with the central challenge of how to promote 
stability and growth in fragile and conflict-affected 
states. Technical approaches to institutional 
reform and development following liberal-
democratic and market economy templates 
were simply not working and the spotlight was 
on the political dynamic driving the choices 
of partner governments. ‘Political settlement’ 
offered a useful framing concept for analysing the 
complex development context and for calibrating 
development interventions to fit that context.
The United Kingdom Department for 
International Development (DFID) led on the 
adoption of ‘political settlement’ as a framing 
concept for policy. Thence it was quickly taken up 
by the OECD International Network on Conflict 
and Fragility and its members. The concept bridged 
the interconnected processes of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding, which were high on the development 
agenda. A political settlement was portrayed as both 
the circuit-breaker for conflict, and the platform for 
statebuilding: it established the conditions to end a 
conflict, and it formed the core, or cornerstone, or 
foundation of every political order. The words vary, 
but the sentiment is the same: every political regime 
is based on some kind of political settlement (DFID 
2009; Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007; OECD 2010, 
2011a, 2011b, 2012; Whaites 2008).
The concept was pressed into service before its 
usage was settled, leaving its proponents to reflect 
on the absence of definitional clarity (Parks and 
Cole 2010:3; Whaites 2008:7) or its still unfolding 
interpretation (OECD 2010:31) while nonetheless 
positioning it centrally in statebuilding policy. 
Within DFID, the definition underwent minor 
adjustments over its first few years until emerging 
in a major DFID practice paper on building 
peaceful states and societies in the following terms:
Political settlements are the expression 
of a common understanding, usually 
forged between elites, about how power 
is organised and exercised. They include 
formal institutions for managing political 
and economic relations, such as electoral 
processes, peace agreements, parliaments, 
constitutions and market regulations. But they 
also include informal, often unarticulated 
agreements that underpin a political system, 
such as deals between elites on the division of 
spoils. (DFID 2010:22)
In its major policy guidance 
note on supporting statebuilding in 
situations of conflict and fragility, 
OECD characterised the term as 
referring to:
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… how the balance of power between elite 
groups is settled through agreement around 
the rules of political engagement. Political 
settlement may be (re)shaped by the outcome 
of a single event (such as a peace agreement), 
or it may reflect an ongoing process of 
exchange and (re)negotiation that extends 
over time where what matters is the conduct 
of key actors … Political settlement refers not 
only to the formal architecture of politics, but 
also to the web of political institutions — the 
informal rules, shared understandings and 
rooted habits that shape political interaction 
and conduct, and that are at the heart of 
every political system. (OECD 2011a:31)
Despite the caveats around the unsettled usage 
of the term, there are significant common elements 
in the DFID and OECD definitions. First, political 
settlements are centrally about the organisation 
and exercise of power. Second, their forging is an 
elite affair. Third, they involve not only the formal 
institutions but also the informal institutions that 
underpin a political system. These features recur in 
the usage adopted by other development agencies 
(AusAID 2011:13; UNDP 2012:18).
The adoption of political settlement as a 
framing concept was intended to highlight the 
quintessentially political character of statebuilding: 
it is the political settlement that is instrumental 
in shaping political and developmental outcomes, 
and not the design of institutions (Di John and 
Putzel 2009:6; OECD 2011a:31; Putzel and Di 
John 2012:1). Understanding of the political 
settlement is hence a crucial tool for framing 
effective development interventions, for assessing 
the potential impact of those interventions on 
the processes of statebuilding, and for avoiding 
doing harm (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2014:5; 
Golooba-Mutebi and Booth 2013:6; OECD 2010; 
Parks and Cole 2010:ix). Putzel and Di John, 
drawing together the policy implications of a 
decade of DFID-funded research through the Crisis 
States Research Centre, pick up on all of these 
elements. Their central premise is that
A better understanding of the possibilities of 
progressive institutional change and policy 
reform can be achieved by seeing the state 
as a political settlement embodying a set of 
power relations. (Putzel and Di John 2012:1)
In the policies emerging in the period 
2008–2012, the character of the political 
settlement assumed considerable prominence: 
inclusive political settlements, it was argued, 
were fundamental for the stability of the state, 
and shaping the character of the settlement was 
elevated to a policy goal. DFID’s 2010 practice 
paper Building Peaceful States and Societies 
included as one of its four policy objectives 
‘support inclusive political settlements and 
processes’. The accompanying text observed that 
exclusionary settlements are more likely to lead to 
instability (DFID 2010:7).3 OECD’s policy guidance 
Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict 
and Fragility similarly encouraged the international 
community to look for opportunities to promote 
inclusive political settlements (OECD 2011a:13) 
and observed that fragility may be a function 
of an exclusionary settlement that represents a 
narrow coalition of interests, while conflict and 
instability may result from settlements drawn along 
exclusionary lines (OECD 2011a:21, 31).
The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding 
and Statebuilding, a grouping of 19 fragile 
and conflict-affected states, multilateral and 
bilateral development partners and international 
organisations which was formed in 2008, has 
also embraced inclusive political settlements and 
peaceful conflict resolution as a paramount goal. 
Its April 2010 Dili Declaration lists the fostering 
of inclusive political settlements and political 
processes, and inclusive political dialogue, at the 
head of its seven peacebuilding and statebuilding 
goals. In its 2011 New Deal for Engagement in 
Fragile States, the first goal is ‘legitimate politics — 
foster inclusive political settlements and conflict 
resolution’.
The World Bank, in its 2011 World 
Development Report on the theme of conflict, 
security and development, takes a slightly different 
tack. It focuses not on inclusive political settlements 
but on ‘inclusive enough coalitions’ which bring 
together the parties needed to move states away 
from the brink of violence. They may involve 
formal power-sharing arrangements, but most 
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frequently they are informal. The key is that they 
include those parties who are necessary to restore 
confidence, transform institutions, and build 
momentum for positive change (World Bank 
2011:xvii, 119–21). In parallel, the OECD also 
began to ask how inclusive is inclusive enough in a 
political settlement (OECD 2011b:30).
In this fast-moving policy discourse, the 
pivotal concepts are still evolving and little related 
empirical work has been undertaken. How then 
does the policy analysis connect with the broader 
research literature and how strong is the evidence 
base for the policies adopted?
Where Did the Political Settlement Concept 
Come From?
The political settlement concept has been described 
as lacking a specific pedigree in political theory 
or political science (Di John and Putzel 2009:6). 
But as a mongrel concept, it can trace its ancestry 
from several literatures including comparative 
politics, international relations, international law, 
peace studies, political economy and development 
studies. Within these bodies of literature the 
concept has three quite distinct meanings, with 
some overlapping features:
(i) a negotiated settlement to end interstate or 
intrastate armed conflict
(ii) a new and transformed political order born of 
crisis and achieved through elite cooperation
(iii) the interdependent arrangement of political 
power and institutions on which a regime 
is based.
The first of these meanings, which has the 
widest currency, sits within the international 
relations and peace literatures; the second 
meaning is found in a small body of comparative 
politics literature; and the third belongs with a 
small but influential cluster of political economy 
and development studies writings. These 
three conceptual applications are discussed 
further below.
(i) Political settlement as negotiated settlement to 
end interstate or intrastate armed conflict
The idea of a negotiated settlement to conflict has 
had a prominent place in international relations 
for at least a century. The 1919 Covenant of the 
League of Nations developed during the Paris 
Peace Conference after World War I provided 
for adjudicated settlements to prevent states in 
dispute from embarking on war. Several articles 
of the Covenant outline mechanisms to initiate a 
settlement process between states in dispute and 
to determine terms for a settlement. The 1945 
Charter of the United Nations, signed as World 
War II was nearing its end, gives the new body a 
strong role in dispute settlement. The first purpose 
of the United Nations listed in Article 1 of the 
Charter is the settlement of international disputes 
by peaceful means. Chapter VI of the Charter, 
entitled ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’, details the 
role of the Security Council in both initiating and 
recommending the terms of a settlement in an 
actual or looming dispute.
As the easing of Cold War polarities in the late 
1980s created a new spirit of collegiality within 
the Security Council, the effective mandate of the 
UN expanded rapidly into the domain of intrastate 
conflict. The mandating of peacekeeping operations 
to support implementation of ‘comprehensive 
settlements’ of conflicts became a growth area for 
the UN from 1988; in some instances, peacemaking 
missions were fielded to help fashion a political 
settlement to create the conditions for peace 
(Goulding 1993:457–59).
From this period, the term ‘political settlement’ 
found its way into the mainstream of UN parlance. 
It was tried out by the General Assembly in 1989 
when it requested ‘the UN Secretary General to 
encourage and facilitate the early realization of a 
comprehensive political settlement in Afghanistan’4 
and came into its own with the succession of 
resolutions supporting a ‘comprehensive political 
settlement’ of the Cambodia conflict.5 Since then, 
the term has been in general currency in the UN as 
the established mechanism for peacemaking.
In the international relations and peace 
literatures a ‘political settlement’ describes, at 
its broadest, a negotiated set of terms to bring a 
conflict to an end or to prevent it from beginning. 
It is distinguished from other mechanisms to end 
conflict such as military victory or peace imposed 
by third parties, or other mechanisms to stop 
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fighting from commencing, such as disarmament 
and external security guarantees. The term is 
applied to both interstate and intrastate conflicts, 
and is generally represented as a transaction fixed 
at a point in time.
Political settlement is something of a 
fungible term, being used by different authors 
interchangeably with ceasefire, peace agreement, 
peace settlement and negotiated settlement. 
Kreutz, for example, describes ceasefires and peace 
agreements as forms of a political settlement and, 
further into the text, of a negotiated settlement 
(Kreutz 2010:245). The interchangeability of 
political settlement and negotiated settlement 
or the conflation of the two terms is common 
(e.g. Barakat and Zyck 2010; Bell 2006; Fuller 
1990; Karl 1992; Rosen 1977; Singer 1958). Other 
authors move about seamlessly between the terms 
peace agreement, peace settlement, negotiated 
settlement and political settlement (e.g. Crocker 
and Hampson 1996; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; 
Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; Walter 2002). The 
term ‘political settlement’ is also used to describe 
two complementary but distinct transactions: the 
process of reaching a settlement by political means 
(e.g. Gaddis 1986:129; Lloyd 1995:160), and the 
political outcome of a negotiated settlement (e.g. 
Hannon 1967). In the past two decades, the latter 
usage has dominated.
Typically, a political settlement as outcome 
spells out in some detail the provisions for the 
organisation and exercise of political power in a 
state emerging from conflict. For example, the 
1991 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict sets out 
in detail the machinery and processes for the 
exercise of power in the transitional period, 
arrangements for the conduct of elections for a 
constituent assembly and for the development 
of a constitution, and specific principles to be 
reflected in the constitution. The 2001 Bougainville 
Peace Agreement, which detailed the terms of 
the political settlement between the leaders of 
the people of Bougainville and the Government 
of Papua New Guinea, included very detailed 
provisions for the amendment of the constitution 
of Papua New Guinea, the development of a 
constitution for an Autonomous Bougainville 
Government (ABG), the division of powers and 
functions between the two, the transfer of powers to 
the ABG, fiscal transfers and the organisation of the 
judiciary.
The interest in negotiated settlements takes 
off in the literature in the 1990s in tandem with 
the proliferation of peace processes ending civil 
conflicts.6 Achieving a settlement of the basic 
political issues behind interstate conflicts in the 
post-World War II period was relatively rare 
(Fortna 2003:346). In contrast, some recasting 
of the political order is a basic element of the 
negotiated settlement of intrastate disputes. Across 
the literature, a negotiated settlement to civil war is 
characterised by its focus on the future organisation 
of political power. For Hartzell and Hoddie, ‘One of 
the central characteristics of a negotiated settlement 
is that adversaries involved in this form of war-
ending bargain directly address the question of 
how power is to be distributed and managed in the 
post-war state’ (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007:5). The 
institutional provisions built into the terms of the 
settlement, they argue, are ‘the central mechanisms 
for establishing enduring, peaceful relations among 
former enemies’ (ibid:3). Bell, similarly, describes 
the link between an end to fighting and agreement 
to ‘new political and legal arrangements for holding 
and exercising power’ (Bell 2006:374). Manning 
observes that ‘a formal democratization process 
has been at the center of virtually every negotiated 
agreement to end civil conflict since the end of the 
Cold War’ (Manning 2004:54).
(ii) Political settlement as a new and transformed 
political order born of crisis and achieved 
through elite cooperation
The concept of ‘elite settlement’ was launched in 
1987 by Burton and Higley ‘as a major, but largely 
overlooked, form of political change’ that paved 
the way to stable democracy (Burton and Higley 
1987:295) and it has continued on as a small niche 
area of comparative politics. Their initial article 
characterised elite settlements as ‘relatively rare 
events in which warring national elite factions sud-
denly and deliberately reorganize their relations by 
negotiating compromises on their most basic disa-
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greements’ (ibid). Elite settlements are triggered 
by a sharp and profoundly dangerous crisis — a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition — which 
drives elites to abandon competition and cooperate 
to effect a change of regime. The effect is to funda-
mentally transform relations among existing elite 
factions, creating a consensually unified elite struc-
ture that provides a foundation for lasting political 
stability. The authors characterise this phenomenon 
as the ‘taming’ of politics (Burton and Higley 1987, 
1998; Higley and Burton 1998).
The determination of the essential elements of 
the settlement is done swiftly, and it is generally 
formalised in a written text such as a signed pact 
or new constitution embodying the understandings 
reached. Once achieved, elite settlements take 
time to consolidate and require a high degree 
of accommodation by elite actors. While they 
involve power-sharing, they always exclude some 
individuals and groups, most notably the former 
power-holders who were overthrown. According 
to the concept’s proponents, elite settlements 
emerge only infrequently. In their 1987 article, 
they identified somewhere between four up to 
possibly six or more in the modern period. By 1998 
the count had risen to a dozen. To a significant 
degree, they concluded, ‘elite settlements are 
historical accidents whose watershed consequences 
underscore the centrality of contingent elite choices 
in political change’ (Higley and Burton 1998:115).
Despite the name, elite settlements engage 
non-elites. Burton and Higley observe that 
although elite factions and their leaders have 
considerable autonomy from mass followings and 
their demands, this is not to suggest that they 
could fashion their settlements without regard for 
non-elite reactions (Burton and Higley 1987:301). 
Gunther reinforces this point, noting that ‘The 
essence of an elite settlement is a bargain among 
elites that their respective supporters will accept’ 
(Gunther 1992:66). While the characteristics 
of elite settlements overlap those of elite pacts 
and other elite processes, settlements can be 
distinguished in that they are much more than 
transient tactical agreements: they fundamentally 
transform political systems and processes (Higley 
and Burton 1998:100–101).
A historical example of an elite settlement 
is the Glorious Revolution in England in 1688–
1689. Triggered by the threat of a return to a 
Catholic monarchy and the prospect of political 
alliance with Catholic France, Whig and Tory 
leaders collaborated in a conspiracy to unseat 
the deeply unpopular King James II and replace 
him with Prince William of Orange (Burton and 
Higley 1987). A more contemporary example is 
the political transition in Spain in the wake of 
General Franco’s death in 1975. The democratic 
consolidation in Spain is attributed to the 
profound transformation of Spain’s elites from 
disunity to consensual unity through two years 
of constitutional negotiations culminating in the 
adoption of a new constitution in December 1978. 
In the process, national elites put their former 
political and social cleavages behind them and 
achieved a high degree of structural integration 
(Gunther 1992).
Although political settlements as negotiated 
settlements and as elite settlements share some 
common features, there are also some fundamental 
points of difference. First, elite settlements involve 
the spontaneous initiative of elites to unite to 
achieve regime change. Negotiated settlements, 
in contrast, are typically brokered by third parties 
such as multilateral or regional bodies and regime 
change may be, but is not necessarily, the central 
goal. Second, although elite settlements emerge at 
a time of crisis, this may manifest in any number 
of ways: economic crisis, the death of a dictator or 
sectarian threat are more often triggers than armed 
conflict. Negotiated settlements, in contrast, emerge 
when armed conflict is threatened or real. Intrastate 
settlements in particular are a response to actual 
and often already protracted conflict.
(iii) Political settlement as the interdependent 
arrangement of political power and institutions 
on which a regime is based
This third usage of the term ‘political settlement’ 
made a number of cameo appearances in the 
sociology and political economy literature from the 
early 1990s before gaining rather wider traction 
a decade later in the think tanks supporting 
international development policy. Seemingly the 
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first use of the concept in an analytical sense 
(Laws 2012:7) was in a study of the role of the 
British state in welfare provisioning, which argued 
that ‘the social policies of the state formed part 
of a wider political settlement at key moments 
of development’ (Melling 1991:219). A few years 
later, the concept was employed in an analysis 
of how institutions create national trajectories 
of growth: the answer, it was suggested, was a 
function of policy and of ‘the political settlements 
that establish the terms of economic development’. 
The settlement acts as a platform for institutional 
performance while new settlements, emerging from 
crisis, can be a game changer for the development 
of new institutional forms (Zysman 1994:256–60).
The concept first made its way into the 
development domain in 1995 when Mushtaq Khan 
employed it to challenge the explanations of new 
institutional economics (NIE) for state failure in 
developing countries. Where the NIE approach 
explained differences in institutional performance 
in terms of institutional structure, Khan argued 
that institutional performance was not just 
dependent on the character of the institution ‘but 
also and critically on the balance of power between 
the classes and groups affected by that institution, 
that is, on the political settlement’ (Khan 1995:77).
Khan returned to this theme 15 years later, 
adopting political settlement analysis as a tool to 
examine institutional behaviour and to identify 
workable governance changes likely to achieve a 
developmental difference (Khan 2010:1). Echoing 
the language of North, Wallis and Weingast in 
their 2009 book Violence and Social Orders, Khan 
notes that:
At the highest level, a political settlement is a 
description of the ‘social order’ that describes 
how a society solves the problem of violence 
and achieves a minimum level of political 
stability and economic performance for it to 
operate as a society.
He goes on to argue that ‘at a deeper level, 
a political settlement implies an institutional 
structure that creates benefits for different classes 
and groups in line with their relative power’. This 
suggests that the notion of a political settlement 
as a stable agreement between elites will only be 
viable if ‘underpinned at a deeper level by a viable 
combination of institutions and a distribution of 
power between organizationally powerful groups in 
that society’. This leads to his definition:
We define a political settlement as an 
interdependent combination of a structure 
of power and institutions at the level of a 
society that is mutually ‘compatible’ and 
also ‘sustainable’ in terms of economic and 
political viability. (Khan 2010:20)
If the combination of power and institutions 
is not viable, there is not a political settlement. 
Viability in turn is defined as the minimum level 
of economic performance and political stability 
needed to hold the institutional structure together 
(Khan 2010). There is an element of circularity in 
this definition: a political settlement exists only 
if it can exist. It also leaves hanging the question 
of whether a polity can exist sans a political 
settlement.
Two important elements of Khan’s analysis are 
the evolving character of political settlements and 
the interplay of formal and informal institutions. 
No political settlement, he tells us, is static. 
Evolution may be gradual or cataclysmic. Where 
political stability or economic performance 
collapse, they are only likely to recover when a new 
settlement emerges, possibly at the end of a period 
of significant conflict (Khan 2010:4–5). Once a 
‘social order emerges, the distribution of power 
becomes embedded in institutional arrangements 
that sustain it’ (Khan 2010:8). In developing 
countries, informal institutions are an important 
component of the institutional structure defining 
the political settlement, and significantly influence 
the behaviour of formal institutions (Khan 
2010:126–27).
Khan was one of a small group of senior 
academics working closely with the governance 
team of the United Kingdom development agency, 
DFID. Adrian Leftwich was another. He also 
rejected the technocratic approach to designing 
formal institutions as a development solution. As 
he graphically puts it, ‘developmental states … 
cannot be constructed out of institution-building 
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kits devised in western capitals or think-tanks’ 
(Leftwich 2000:8). Writing at the same time as 
Khan, he argues that developmental outcomes 
are politically determined (Leftwich 1994, 1995, 
2000). Central to his analysis is that politics shapes 
institutions (Leftwich 2005:593). Politics, he 
suggests, should be thought of at two levels: the 
first concerns the fundamental institutions (or rules 
of the game) that shape political life; the second 
concerns the politics (games) that take place within 
the rules. In many countries the rules, both formal 
and informal, pull in different directions. In other 
words, it is the political settlement that constrains 
development choices (Leftwich 2006:24–25). Booth 
and Golooba-Mutebi (2014:5) make the same 
argument:
The political settlements/elite bargain 
approach rejects the proposition that 
progress is a matter of adopting the ‘right’ 
formal institutions or of complying with 
generally accepted liberal-democratic norms 
and practices … It is the nature of the 
political settlement that shapes a country’s 
possibilities, not the formal structures 
as such.
The characterisation of a political settlement as 
an arrangement of political power and institutions 
done by elites is common across the development 
literature of the past decade. For Di John and 
Putzel, drawing on Khan, political settlements are 
‘bargaining outcomes among contending elites’, 
producing the distribution of power on which 
any state is based and expressed through the 
prevailing institutions (Di John and Putzel 2009:4). 
Subsequently the same authors argue that the state 
is best seen as a political settlement embodying a 
set of power relations (Putzel and Di John 2012:1). 
Rocha Menocal introduces an element of social 
contract, defining a political settlement as ‘the 
expression of a common understanding, usually 
forged among elites, about how political power 
is to be organised and exercised, and about how 
the nature of the relationship between state and 
society is to be articulated’; she goes on to refer 
to the evolving character of settlements as social 
actors continue to negotiate the nature of their 
relationship (Rocha Menocal 2011:1721). While 
Laws finds no empirical support for political 
settlements as a social contract, he does argue 
that they are a ‘two-level game’ of interactions 
between key elites, and between those elites and 
their respective followers; ‘it is this combination of 
horizontal and vertical relations that should be at 
the centre of the definition of political settlements’, 
he argues (Laws 2012:9).
Empirical research supporting this third 
usage of ‘political settlement’ is surprisingly thin, 
and follows very different analytical paths. One 
approach is to describe political settlements in 
terms of broad types (e.g. capitalist, clientalist or 
limited access order) based on the defining features 
of the economic and social order; a very different 
approach describes political settlements in terms of 
their context-specific organising principles. Khan 
uses the first approach. He presents a typology 
of political settlements based on whether or not 
formal institutions are growth-supporting, and 
whether or not holding power is aligned with 
formal institutions. He then examines how the type 
of political settlement and changes to it help to 
explain critical aspects of institutional performance 
in several national and sub-national case studies. 
Golooba-Mutebi and Booth’s analysis of the 
political settlement in Rwanda uses the second 
approach. They describe the political settlement 
in terms of three interdependent elements: a 
commitment to power-sharing among those 
parties who are firmly aligned against a revival of 
ethnic sectarianism; a focus on development rather 
than negotiation as the principal path to national 
reconciliation; and pursuit of an alternative to 
clientalist political competition (Golooba-Mutebi 
and Booth 2013:4). Phillips, also following the 
second approach, finds that the defining feature 
of Somaliland’s political settlement is popular 
acquiescence to capture of the key drivers of 
economic growth by elites in exchange for 
protection from violence in the form of civil war 
(Phillips 2013:12).
The boundaries between political settlements, 
elite bargains and elite pacts, and the substance 
of these distinctions, are far from clear. Laws is 
careful to distinguish political settlements from 
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‘elite pacts and related concepts such as elite 
bargains and peace agreements’ (Laws 2012:26). 
In contrast, an OECD paper (2011b:11) makes 
an en passant reference to settlements as elite 
pacts. Golooba-Mutebi and Booth (2013:8–10) 
reference political settlement and elite bargain as 
alternative but fundamentally synonymous terms. 
Extrapolating from his definition and typology of 
political settlements, Khan seems to suggest that a 
political settlement is likely to be in existence for 
an extended period. It undergoes adjustments over 
time as elites engage in bargaining and realign, 
but the settlement itself remains in place. In other 
words, the actors change, but the script and the 
set design do not. Di John and Putzel (2009), on 
the other hand, give greater prominence to the 
elite bargain: it is described as both underpinning 
the political settlement and underpinning the 
state. To further muddy the waters, they note 
that settlements can take the form of ‘political 
coalitions’. Lindemann largely sidesteps the term 
political settlement altogether, framing his cognate 
research around the concept of ‘elite bargain’ 
(Lindemann 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2011).
Pinpointing where a settlement begins and ends 
is another amorphous exercise. An OECD framing 
paper reflects on the dynamic character of political 
settlements, which must adapt to shifting power 
relations. It goes on to observe that ‘the malleability 
of the concept of political settlement makes it 
difficult to determine in some cases whether a 
certain settlement is still in place, has only been 
adapted to changing circumstances or has been 
replaced by a new one’ (OECD 2011b:10, 29).
The foregoing is just a sample of the shifting, 
intersecting and diverging interpretations of the 
term ‘political settlement’ in this third usage, 
complicating its application as a tool of analysis.
Where Does This Leave Us?
Across the literatures, there is a shared kernel to 
the idea of political settlement:
• settlements at their core address the 
organisation and exercise of political power
• settlements are largely elite-driven, although 
they also draw on wider support bases
• settlements are the product of conflict and/or 
crisis
• settlements shape institutions.
Importantly, there are also significant areas 
of difference. The first relates to the form of the 
settlement. In the international relations and 
peace literatures, it assumes concrete form as 
an agreement made at a point in time; similarly 
in the comparative politics literature the elite 
settlement is resolved swiftly and embodied in a 
written document such as a pact or constitution. In 
contrast, in the political economy and development 
literatures the settlement is a rather nebulous 
phenomenon. The OECD framing paper on 
political settlements (OECD 2011b) captures the 
distinction well, describing a settlement variously as 
an event and as a process. But the characterisation of 
political settlement as process has its limitations, as 
Laws points out:
if … political settlements are characterised 
exclusively as on-going political processes, 
and are not identified in part by their 
embodiment in formal institutional details, 
agreements, pacts, events, and so on, then a 
risk is that they simply become synonymous 
with ‘politics’ more generally. (Laws 2012:24)
The second difference relates to the purview 
of the settlement: in the peace and international 
relations literature it may involve either an 
interstate or an intrastate agreement, although 
the latter has become more frequent; in the 
comparative politics, political economy and 
development literatures, a settlement pertains to 
a single state, describing its basic organisation 
of power.
The third difference is around the institutional 
outcome of settlements. In the international 
relations, peace and comparative politics literatures, 
the outcome is a set of formal institutional 
arrangements for the exercise of power, spelt-out 
peace agreements, pacts and constitutions. In the 
political economy and development literatures, the 
effect of the settlement on informal institutions is 
also an important element.
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The Inclusion-Stability Nexus in Policy and 
Theory
Recent international development policies on 
statebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected states 
enjoin development practitioners to promote 
inclusive political settlements in the interests of 
stability. There is considerable support for the 
nexus between inclusion and stability — and 
exclusion and instability — in the academic 
literature, but the relationship is not quite as 
unequivocal as policy suggests.
Strongest support for the link between 
inclusion and stability is found in the research 
on the negotiated settlement of civil wars. This 
research stepped up exponentially in the period 
following the Cold War as settlements proliferated. 
In tandem, attention progressively shifted from 
the conditions bringing conflict to an end to the 
conditions preventing conflict from recurring, 
opening up in turn an exploration of the empirical 
relationship between the character of the 
settlement and stability or instability. A study from 
the Cold War transition period found that ‘stable 
settlements can emerge under a remarkable variety 
of conditions’ but continued on that the nature of 
the political settlement — or expressed another 
way the kind of polity that emerged — was clearly 
useful in explaining the recurrence or otherwise 
of civil violence (Licklider 1993:17–19, 315). This 
study reported a mixed outcome on inclusiveness. 
Citing the conflict resolution literature which 
suggests that settlements are more likely to survive 
where rivals are included in the governing process, 
it replicated this outcome in three of its civil war 
case studies but identified a fourth very stable 
settlement that was deliberately exclusionary 
(Licklider 1993:17–18, 315).
In the past decade, a succession of significant 
studies of the negotiated settlement of armed 
conflicts or the recurrence of armed conflict 
after a civil war is brought to an end explore the 
relationship between the features of the settlement 
and subsequent peace trajectories, establishing 
a strong a nexus between inclusion and stability 
or conversely exclusion and instability. Walter 
(2002) found that when warring parties obtained 
power-sharing guarantees (and third-party security 
guarantees for the demobilisation period) as part of 
a negotiated settlement, they would implement the 
settlement. Without such guarantees, they would 
sooner or later walk away from the settlement 
and revert to war. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 
2007) found that the inclusion of power-sharing 
and power-dividing institutions in negotiated 
settlements played a significant role in fostering 
an enduring peace. The more dimensions of state 
power were shared or divided, the greater the 
prospect of peace. Call (2012) starts not with the 
settlement, but the downstream failure of peace 
and explores why this occurred. While noting that 
‘no single factor or variable accounts for success in 
consolidating peace and averting war recurrence’, he 
finds that
… one factor seems to play a more common 
causal role in civil war recurrence than others. 
This central finding is that political exclusion, 
rather than economic or social factors, plays 
the decisive role in most cases of civil war 
recurrence: Political exclusion acts as a trigger 
for renewed armed conflict. Conversely, 
political inclusion, including but not limited 
to powersharing arrangements, is highly 
correlated with consolidation of peace. (Call 
2012:4)
The evidence, however, is not entirely one 
way. Jarstad and Nilsson (2008), who look beyond 
the inclusion of power-sharing provisions in 
negotiated settlements to the actual implementation 
of those provisions, find that the implementation 
of political power-sharing pacts does not reduce 
the risk of peace breaking down whereas the 
implementation of military and territorial power-
sharing pacts produces a positive correlation with 
the maintenance of peace. Martin (2013) confirms 
this result and, through a more granular analysis of 
several elements of political power-sharing, finds 
that the sharing of executive power is a particularly 
unstable form of post-conflict governance. Samuels 
(2006:681) reaches a similar conclusion.
A central pillar of the elite settlement literature 
is that a broadly inclusive elite settlement provides 
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the foundation for stable politics. A segment of the 
considerably larger comparative politics literature 
on institutional design is also centrally concerned 
with the relationship between inclusive (power-
sharing) institutions and stability. Consociational 
theory, pioneered by Lijphart, argued that 
specific power-sharing and power-dividing 
structures afford the mechanism to achieve stable 
democratic government in plural societies where 
political alignments correspond closely with 
ethnic, religious or other divisions. The principal 
institutional elements identified to achieve broad-
based inclusion were the sharing of executive 
power and localised group autonomy (Lijphart 
1977). In the wake of the Cold War, Lijphart 
extended the analysis to deeply divided societies, 
concluding that ‘consociational democracy is not 
only the optimal form of democracy for deeply 
divided societies but also, for the most deeply 
divided countries, the only feasible solution’ 
(Lijphart 2002:37).
From the 1990s, consociationalism acquired 
a new lease of life in the academic and applied 
literature on peacebuilding as a broad consensus 
emerged on the need for inclusivity and power-
sharing to secure the peace. Rothchild (2002:119) 
writes that ‘Of all the choices encountered by those 
engaged in negotiations to end a civil war, none is 
more crucial than designing the representational 
basis of political institutions’. Reynolds, in his book 
Designing Democracy in a Dangerous World, takes a 
similar line: ‘If there is a single take-home message 
drawn from this study it would be: the foundations 
of democratic stability rest on inclusion’ (Reynolds 
2011:11; emphasis in original). Inclusion, he 
continues, is a necessity. The key is to determine 
‘who needs to be included in the process of 
governance and how that inclusion is manifested’. 
While generally rejecting majoritarianism in any 
fledgling democracy, he suggests that ‘the precise 
framework of the actual inclusive (power sharing) 
arrangements required can vary substantially’ 
(Reynolds 2011:12). Reilly and Reynolds, 
working on a smaller canvas, argue that when 
doing institutional design of electoral systems, 
transitional democracies emerging from deep-
rooted conflict have a greater need of inclusiveness 
and a lower threshold for adversarial politics (Reilly 
and Reynolds 2000:435).
Despite the enthusiasm of its proponents, 
the academic community is divided about the 
efficacy of institutional design as such in stabilising 
conflict-affected states. This is less an assault on the 
relationship between inclusion and stability than on 
the mechanism of institutional design alone as the 
determinative factor. Bastian and Luckham (2003), 
distilling a collection of case studies, conclude 
that it is often less the formal institutional choices 
that matter than the politics around them, that it 
is difficult to envisage institutional designs that 
would fully resolve any of the conflicts included in 
their analysis, and that institutions alone will not 
resolve conflicts. Reflecting on the evidence, they 
suggest that they are tempted to propose a new 
iron law: the ‘iron law of the perverse consequences 
of institutional design’ (2003:314). Kurtenbach 
and Mehler (2013:1) share the scepticism about 
the efficacy of post-conflict institutional design, 
observing that ‘the balance sheet of such efforts 
remains mixed and the academic debate is 
inconclusive as to what works and what does not 
… In practice, examples of successful institutional 
engineering are rare while failures abound’.
Lindemann, like Bastian and Luckham, 
argues that it is not institutional design but 
rather the inclusive nature of the underlying 
configuration of political power that determines 
stability (Lindemann 2011:1843). Putzel and Di 
John (2012:4) emphasise institutional effect over 
institutional form, distilling an extensive body 
of research into the policy dictum ‘Patterns of 
inclusion and exclusion are central to the stability 
and resilience of political settlements, but important 
more in terms of outcomes than the formal 
institutional arrangements governing access to 
state power’.
The relationship between inclusion and stability 
is central to two recent and highly cited political 
economy studies which describe, in essence, the 
character of political settlements. The central thesis 
of Acemoglu and Robinson’s book, Why Nations 
Fail (2012), is that inclusive political and economic 
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institutions are the engine room for growth and 
stability. This is contrasted with the effect of 
extractive political and economic institutions that 
are tightly controlled by narrow elites to maximise 
their interests, ultimately stifling growth and 
sowing the seeds of instability and, at worst, state 
failure. The thesis is buttressed by a plethora of 
examples from across the globe and across history. 
A few years earlier, North et al. in their book 
Violence and Social Orders (2009) also spanned 
history to explore the relationship between state 
structures and violence. How is violence limited, 
they ask? ‘Our answer forms the basis for this book 
and, we believe, a new conceptual framework for 
the social sciences. Controlling violence depends 
on the structure and maintenance of relationships 
among powerful individuals’ (North et al. 2009:18), 
that is, on an inclusive-enough coalition of elites to  
ensure mutual cooperation rather than conflict.7
This analysis has wide currency among 
scholars of development. Khan (2010) argues that 
political stability is a function of inclusive-enough 
political settlements that afford sufficient benefits 
to significant power-holders to discourage them 
from attempting to overturn the status quo. Di 
John and Putzel, similarly, argue from case study 
research that an elite ‘bargain that is inclusive of 
major contending elites and protects their shared 
economic interests has the best chance to endure 
over time’ (2009:15). Lindemann (2008, 2010a, 
2010b, 2011), across a series of case studies, also 
argues that postcolonial trajectories of civil war 
or political stability are largely determined by the 
character of the elite bargain. Foreshadowing Call’s 
analysis (2012), his central hypothesis is that ‘a 
country’s vulnerability to civil war is determined 
by the character of its elite bargain. While inclusive 
elite bargains facilitate civil war avoidance, 
exclusionary elite bargains favour the onset of civil 
war’ (Lindemann 2010a:7).
Is the relationship between inclusion and 
stability as unequivocal as some of the literature 
seems to affirm? The political economy literature 
points to an important qualification: the central 
consideration is how inclusive the elite settlement 
or elite bargain is, that is, whether those with 
sufficient power to destabilise the polity are 
included or not. This is reflected in some of 
the main conceptual commentaries on political 
settlements. Di John and Putzel distil from the 
literature the observation that ‘at low levels of 
development, the general nature of political 
settlements that are likely to generate political order 
are far from inclusionary’ (2009:14). Laws (2012) 
also argues against a straightforward link between 
the inclusivity of the settlement and political 
stability, referencing instances where exclusion of a 
particular group actually contributed to the stability 
of a settlement, at least for a certain period. What 
is important, he suggests, is the relative political 
power of those who are included and excluded. In 
line with this analysis, Golooba-Mutebi and Booth 
observe that while elite bargains and political 
settlements are not necessarily highly inclusive, they 
do not last where elites with the power to mount an 
effective challenge to the dominant elite are left out 
(2013:10).
The bottom line would seem to be that an 
inclusive settlement is conducive to stability, but 
stability is not necessarily a function of an inclusive 
settlement. The critical question for policymakers 
is, rather, how inclusive is inclusive enough in a 
particular context, and what policy compromises 
might that entail.
Conclusion
While the term ‘political settlement’ has been 
around for at least 60 years and possibly rather 
longer,8 it is striking that it rose to prominence 
in several literatures around the late 1980s and 
early nineties. The timing seems more than mere 
coincidence. This was when the Cold War was 
coming to an end, creating fundamental geopolitical 
shifts: new states were emerging, existing states 
were undergoing major transformations, and new 
avenues were opening up for multilateral efforts to 
bring conflicts to an end and strengthen ‘fragile’ 
states. For various academic fields examining 
aspects of these changes, the settlement concept 
helped to characterise or to explain a route to stable 
democracy (comparative politics), the mechanism 
for ending conflict (peace and international 
relations) and the highly political character of 
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statebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected states 
(political economy and development studies).
Two of these literatures seemingly met and 
intermingled in the highly charged policy space 
focused on statebuilding in fragile and conflict-
affected states in the mid-2000s: the peace and 
conflict literature concerned with the political 
settlement of armed conflicts, and the political 
science and political economy literature concerned 
with the politics of development. Out of this was 
born a hybrid concept of political settlement with 
features of both parents, but without the strong 
empirical roots of either. As a result, the concept 
is simultaneously attractive and familiar but also 
amorphous and under-elaborated, and those using 
the term ‘political settlement’ often find themselves 
talking at cross-purposes. The common features of 
the concept that can be distilled from the various 
literatures — the organisation and exercise of 
political power, the agency of elites and coalitions, 
and the impact on institutions — provide a 
valuable analytical frame for understanding the 
politics of development, but it cannot be said with 
any confidence that these add up to a common 
understanding of what constitutes a political 
settlement in the policy discourse and how that 
understanding should then be applied to support 
empirical work to in turn inform development 
practice.
The policy contention that inclusive political 
settlements support stability while exclusionary 
settlements contain the seeds for instability finds 
solid support in the literature, but the relationship 
is more qualified than early expressions of 
the policy concept suggested. The language is 
now shifting to achieving an ‘inclusive enough’ 
settlement or coalition, but without much 
exploration of what this entails and what the 
implications may be. This suggests a new and 
important area for empirical work.
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Endnotes
1 The development policy community has 
commissioned several conceptual studies to work out 
exactly what ‘political settlement’ means and what it 
builds on (e.g. Di John and Putzel 2009; Laws 2012; 
OECD 2011b).
2 The first appearance that I have identified is Whaites 
(2007). The analysis contained in this paper parallels 
that of Fritz and Rocha Menocal (2007).
3 DFID’s emerging policy paper, Building the State and 
Securing the Peace, from the previous year contained 
a similar argument, that maintaining stability would 
depend on the political settlement (DFID 2009:18).
4 UN General Assembly 1989, ‘The situation in 
Afghanistan and its implications for international 
peace and security’, resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly, 1 November 1989, A/RES/44/15, 
1 November 1989.
5 UN Security Council 1990, Resolution 668 (1990) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2941st 
meeting, on 20 September 1990, S/RES/668 (1990); 
UN Security Council 1991, Resolution 718 (1991) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3015th 
meeting, on 31 October 1991, S/RES/718 (1991); UN 
General Assembly 1990, ‘The situation in Cambodia’, 
resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 
15 October 1990, A/RES/45/3; UN General Assembly 
1991, ‘The situation in Cambodia’, resolution adopted 
by the General Assembly, 20 November 1991,  
A/RES/46/18.
6 In the 15 years from 1990, some 50 per cent of all civil 
wars ended with negotiated settlements, compared 
with 20 per cent in the previous two centuries (Bell 
2006:373).
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7 Lindemann (2011:1843) characterises the description 
by North et al. (2009) of a stable political order 
achieved through the formation of a dominant elite 
coalition as a political settlement.
8 The term appears, for example, in Oppenheimer 
(1953).
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